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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
LORAINE J. WHITE, 
Plaintiff and App·eUee, 
-vs.-
NATIONAL POSTAL TRANS-PORT 
ASSOCIATION, formerly RAIL-
WAY MAIL ASSOCIATION, 
D ef end{]Jnt and App-ellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FAC-TS 
Case No. 
7829 
This appeal is taken from a jury verdict in an action 
brought on a pro;vision for the payment of death benefits 
for accidental death contained in the Certificate, Con-
stitution, and By-Laws of the Defendant association, of 
which Plaintiff's husband was a member at the time of 
his death. 
In accordance with its C-onstitution and By-Laws, 
(Ex. 6) Defendant association issued to Milton H. White, 
husband of Plaintiff, a certificate (Ex. A) providing 
for the payment· of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) 
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if death resulted from accidental injuries alone. The 
certificate provides: 
"Provided, however, no benefit or sum what-
soever shall be payable in any case whatsoever 
unless the accident alone results in producing visi-
ble, external marks of injury or violence suffered 
by the body of the member, nor unless the death or 
disability results wholly from the injury and with-
in one year from the date thereof. Nor shall any 
benefit be paid for death or disability which re-
sults from voluntary inflicted injuries, be a mem-
ber sane or insane, nor from poison or other in-
. jurious matter taken or administered accidentally 
or otherwise; nor as the result of any surgical 
operation." 
"Accidental death shall be construed to be 
either sudden, violent death from external violent 
and accidental means resulting directly, independ-
ently and exclusively of any othe-r causes; and not 
the direct or indirect result of the member's own 
vicious or unlawful conduct; or death within one 
year as the sole result of accidental me.ans alone. 
There shall be no liability whatever when disease, 
defect, or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause 
of deat-h. The Railway Mail Association shall not 
be liable for any claims arising from appendicitis 
caused by trauma or otherwise." (Italics sup-
plied) 
The Constitution and By-Laws of the Association 
which are incorporated by reference·, as of the date of 
death, by the provisions of the certificate (Ex. A), pro-
vide at page 38 of Ex. 6 as follows : 
"Accidental death and external injuries are 
defined to be either sudden, violent death or acci-
dental injuries from violent and accidental mean~ 
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alone resulting directly, independently and ex-
clusiYelv of all other causes and not the result of 
1nembe~'s o'Yn vicious, intemperate, or unlawful 
conduct, and producing visible marks or other evi-
dence of injury or violence on or within the body 
of the n1ember. There shall be no liability what-
e,ver, unless death or disability results wholly 
from the injury, nor when a.ny disease, defect, or 
bodily infirmity ,is a contributing cause of death, 
disability, or injury, nor shall any benefit be paid 
when death or disability results from voluntary 
inflicted injuries by the member, be he sane or 
insane, nor from any anesthetic, poison, or drug 
taken or administered accidently or otherwise, 
nor as the result of any surgical operation, nor by 
reason of the administration of an anesthetic 
prior to surgical operation, nor during any other 
preparation for surgical operation (except where 
the surgical treatment or preparation thereof is 
made necessary by an accident), nor as a result 
of any surgical, electrical, sani-practice, osteo ... 
pathic or chiropractic treatment, or treatment of 
any sort intended to cure or alleviate mental or 
bodily ills, whether self-administered by the Inem-
ber or by any other p·erson whomsoever, nor shall 
benefits cover nor extend to any of the following 
conditions, to-wit: appendicitis, fits, epilepsy, 
mental infirmity, ptomaine poisoning, bacterial 
infection (except a pyogenic infection occurring 
with and through an accidental cut or wound), 
arthritis, varicocele, cerebral hemorrhage, meni-
geal hemorrhage, spinal hemorrhage, heat pros-
tration, sunstroke or sunburn, nor epididymitis 
or orchitis (unless caused by direct trauma)." 
(Italics supplied) · 
The facts as to the life, illness, injury, and death 
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of Milton H. White are not in dispute. Plaintiff testi-
fied as to the accident in August, 1949, and the inci-
dents surrounding his last moments. Plaintiff also pro-
duced two physicians, one a heart specialist, who at-
tended Mr. White during his lifetime. Defendant also 
produced a heart specialist. All of the medical testimony 
was in substantial agreement. The only dispute is the 
application of the contractual provisions contained in the 
certificate and in the Constitution and By-Laws to the 
facts developed at the trial. 
The evidence shows that Mr. White was at the time 
of his death on February 14, 1950, aged 63. (Ex. 2) He 
was suffering from rheumatic heart disease resulting 
from rheumatic fever in childhood. He had been under 
medical treatment by Dr. Edward P. Goddard for this 
heart condition for about one year prior to injury claimed 
by Plaintiff to have been the sole cause of death. (TR. 
66) As a p·art of his treatment, he had been given mer-
cuhydrin and thiomerin ( TR 55), medicines character-
ized by his attending physician ( TR 70-73) as typical 
of advanced heart disease and congestive heart failure. 
A typical symptom of his heart condition, auricular fi-
brillation, was the throwing out of emboli or frag1nents 
of blood clots (TR 54) which are pumped out into the 
body and may block the circulation in an extremity or a 
vital organ of the body. (TR 79) While under treatment 
and observation by Dr. Goddard, he had at least two 
of these typical embolic episodes ( TR 71), one in the 
spleen and the other in the leg. Subsequently, while 
under treatment by Dr. Olson, a heart specialist, he had 
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a third in the kidney or abdo1ninal area. ( TR 55) A 
fourth embolus struck his brain on February 14, 1950, 
and caused his death (TR 56 and Exs. 2 and 3), in the 
opinion of Dr. Olson, the attending physician who testi-
fied for Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff testified that on August 25, 1949, while she 
and her husband were on a trip visiting relatives in 
Dodge City, Kansas, ~Ir. White received a bump on the 
rear calf of the right leg. The injury occurred when a 
bench being moved stuck, and when jerked loose, its 
corner struck 1Ir. \V.hite in the rear of his leg. The blow 
rnade no mark at the time (TR 8) but commenced to dis-
color on the way home to Ogden. When the Whites re-
turned to Ogden on September 3, 1949, Dr. Goddard was 
called and 1Ir. White was placed in St. Benedict's Hospi-
tal with congestiv~ heart failure (TR 67) at which time 
Dr. Olson was called in as a heart specialist. On S.ep-
tember 8, an embolectomy was performed (Ex. 4 and 
TR 38) to remove a clot in the artery of the leg. Some 
clot was removed (TR 38), but the circulation of the leg 
did not improve, gangrene set in (TR 39), and on Octo-
ber 29, 1949 (Ex. 4), the leg was amputated above the 
knee. A pathological examination (Ex. 5) of the ampu-
tated portion of the leg developed that Mr. White had 
also been suffering from obliterating thromboangiitis 
of the vessels of the right leg, which condition is also 
known as Buerger's Disease (TR 45 and 73). 
Mr. White's recovery from the amputation operation 
was normal. The wound healed properly, and discussion 
was being had with respect to fitting him with an arti-
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ficial leg. (TR 72-73) But on the evening of F'ebruary 
13-14, 1950, White, after an attack of nausea, had what 
amounted to a convulsion, slipped off the bed and died. 
Dr. Olson was called, pronounced Mr. White dead on his 
arrival, and fixed the immediate cause of death as cere-
bral artery embolism. (Ex. 2) That was still his opinion 
on the day of the trial. (TR 56, 57) That was also the 
opinion of Dr. Peltzer, the heart specialist called by the 
Defendant association. (TR 81) Dr. Goddard, the only 
other medical expert called by Plaintiff, stated in the 
application for benefits filed with the Defendant asso-
ciation (Ex. 1), "This man has since expired, at which 
time I was not in attendance, but apparently due to his 
heart disease." Dr. Goddard further testified at the trial 
that he was in no position to venture an opinion as to 
the cause of death due to the fact that he was not present 
at Mr. White's death (TR 70). 
Application for benefits was filed by Plaintiff with 
the Defendant association on May 5, 1950. The claim 
was denied on the ground that the accidental bump on the 
leg in August 1949 was not directly, independently and 
exclusively the cause of the death, but that lhe heart dis-
ease and Buerger's Disease were, at least, contributing 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
{a) TillS CASE AT LEAST BELONGS IN CATEGORY THREE OF 
Browning v. Equitable Life. 
_ {b) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 9. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING THE JURY 
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Contractual provisions similar to the ones in this 
case have been before this court some half dozen times 
since 1937. The first of this series, 
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurwnce 
Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 Pac. 2nd 1060 
established the law of this state in interpreting the 
"accidental means alone" clause. The Browning case con-
cerned a claim for disability payments by a dentist who 
had sprained his finger in an accident. The policy cov-
ered loss "resulting directly and independently of all 
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other ~ause~s, from bodily injuries effected during the 
term of this policy, solely through external, violent, and 
accidental means." The court, speaking through Mr. 
Justice Larsen, outlined three categories in which cases 
arising under similar policies or similar clauses have 
been classified. These are : 
" ( 1) When an accident causes a diseased 
condition which, together with the accident, re-
sults in the injury or death complained of, the 
accident alone is to be considered the cause of 
the injury or death. 
"(2) When, at the time of the accident, the 
insured was suffering from some disease, but the 
disease had no causal connection with the injury 
or death resulting from the accident, the accident 
is to be considered the sole cause. 
"(3) When, at the time of the accident, 
there was an existing disease which cooperating 
with the accident resulted in the injury or death7 
the accident cannot be considered as the sole 
cause or as the cause independent of all other 
causes." (72 Pac. 2nd 1073). 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his dissenting opinion on 
rehearing of 
Browning vs. Equitable Life, 80 Pac. 2nd 
348 at 353 
further breaks down category (3) as follows: 
"These words must, by their plain and in-
evitable meaning, exclude liability for any dis-
ability where either ( 1) the sole- cause was other 
than the injury, or ( 2) the preponderating cause 
of disability was any other cause than the injury 
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effected solely through external, violent and acci-
dentalineans, or (3) 'vhere there was an efficient 
concurring cause besides the injury, and such 
concurring cause 'vas not produced or set in 
motion by the accident or injury." 
The point 'vhich divided the court in the Browning 
case and which "'"as the issue in the five cases subse-
quently consid~red by this court was the choice of 
category and the Inethod of making that choice. 
The Lee case, 
Lee vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 95 Utah 
445, 82 Pac. 2nd 178, 
added a new corollary to category two, as stated by the 
court, 
HThe rule, as we believe it to be on the facts 
which this jury was justified in finding, is that 
where an accidental injury sets in motion or starts 
activity of a latent or dormant disease, and such 
disease contributes to the death after having been 
so preci pita ted by the accident, the disease is 
not a direct or indirect cause of death nor a 
contributing cause in the meaning of the terms 
of the policy, but the accident which started the 
mischief and precipitated the condition resulting 
in death is the sole cause of death." 
In, 
Clayton vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 
96 Utah 331, 85 Pac. 2nd 819, 
the trial court found sufficient conflict in the evidence 
to submit to the jury a determination of whether the 
accident caused the disabling illness. The jury having 
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In 
"In the case at bar, it was permissible for 
the: jury to find that the respondent's appendix 
was not diseased or infected prior to the blow, 
and that the blow to the abdomen was the sole 
cause of the appendicitis and disability, without 
any question of pre-existent condition or concur-
rent, contributing cause." (85 Pac. 2nd 819 at 
822). 
Hanley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Neu, 
York, 106 Utah 184, 147 Pac. 2nd 319 
the assured suffered a blow in the groin from the fall of 
a heavy steel bar, causing a hernia. He was later oper-
ated on for the hernia and died very suddenly from 
pulmonary embolism. The case would clearly have come 
within category one and the company held liable but 
for the fact that over 90 days had intervened between 
the injury and the death, an excluding condition of the 
policy. The court did, however, allow recovery on a 
theory, not pertinent to the case at bar, that the sur-
gical operation was a violent external and accidental 
means within the policy if the resulting death from the 
surgery was unexpected. The effect of this theory on 
surgical operation cases was clarified in 
Kellogg vs. California Western States Life 
Insurance Co., ______ Utah ______ , 201 Pac. 2nd 949, 
where recovery on the policy was denied when, because 
of the poor physical condition of the assured, post-
operative shock was expected, and the death, therefore, 
not accidental. 
Tucker vs. New York Life Insuranc·e Co., 
107 Utah 478, 155 Pac. 2nd 173 
10 
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fell in category three. In that case, the decedent slipped 
on the ice and fractured his arm on November 19, 1941. 
He died on December 7, 1941, from a dissecting aneurism 
of the aorta. The evidence showed that he had high 
blood pressure caused by atherosclerosis, which had 
been a chronic condition, for which he had been tre-ated 
for about a year. The undisputed medical testimony 
was that the aorta gave way as a result of a diseased 
condition which had so weakened the artery that it could 
not stand the increased blood pressure caused by the 
fall or strain after the injury. This court reversed 
the lower court and held that it should have given a 
directed verdict in favor of the defendants, stating, 
"Mr. Nichols' condition at the time of the 
accident was one in which he had an existing 
disease which cooperated with the accident in 
causing his death. This co1npels us to conclude 
that the accident cannot be considered the sole 
cause of insured's death, and from this actual 
picture, we must conclude that this case is one 
which falls in the third class of cases set forth 
in Mr. Justice Larsen's opinion in Browning vs. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society, Supra, and the 
cases there cited." 
(a) This Case at Least Belongs i.n Category Three 
of Browning vs. Equitable Life. 
It is submitted that the case at bar belongs with 
the Tucker case in category three. The court ~here said, 
"The record contains no testimony contrary 
to these facts and opinions given by Dr. Richards 
who was called by Plaintiffs and upon whose 
testimony their case muRt stand. The picture of 
the insured's physical condition could be enlarged 
11 
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and made even plainer by including other testi-
mony given by both Dr. Richards and Dr. Viko. 
The reco-rd shows conclusively that there is no 
conflict in the evidence as to the material issues 
of this case. 
"That Mr. Nichols had been suffering from 
high blood pressure for at least a year prior to 
his fall must be accepted as true. There is not 
any evidence to the contrary. He had been suf-
fering from a known disease for a pe-riod of a 
year or longer. This condition or disease was, 
in the opinion of the doctors, not only active but 
progressive. Both doctors expressed a belief that 
the intima of the aorta gave way and caused 
death, and this was the result of the diseased 
condition which had so weakened this main artery 
that it could not stand the increased blood pres-
sure occasioned by the fall, or the strain imposed 
upon the aorta after the injury." (155 Pac. 173-
17 6). (Emphasis supplied). 
These same things may be said in the case at bar. 
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the cause of 
death. The death certificate (Ex. 2) and the medical 
proof of cause of death (Ex. 3) submitted by Dr. Olson 
on behalf. of Plaintiff, both recite "cerebral artery em-
.bolism" and "rheumatic heart disease" as the causes of 
death. The . death certificate itself was prima facia evi-
dence of the facts therein stated, including the attending 
physician's opinion as to the cause of death. (Sec. 35-2-
20, Utah Code Ann. 1943). 
Bozicevich vs. Kenilworth Mere., 58 Utah 458, 
199 Pac. 406; 
Griffin vs. Prudential Insurance Co., 102 Utah 
363, 133 Pac. 2nd 333. 
12 
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It is stated in the Griff,in case that evidence of the 
type contained on the death certificate 1nay be explained 
or contradicted by competent evidence. What the corurt 
there 1neant by that can best be deter1nined by examining 
its sunnuary of the evidence "'"hich it said was sufficient 
to explain or contradict the death certificate and to sus-
tain the verdict of the jury. The doctor in that case 
arrived after the man was unconscious, and jail inmates 
told him the insured had suffered an epileptic fit. An 
autopsy did show insured suffered from chronic alco-
holisin and incident disorders, but did not confirm epi-
lepsy. There was also no evidence that insured had 
ever been known to have suffered from epileptic con-
vulsions. This court there said, 
"The fact is that the doctor who filled out 
the death certificate admitted that in making such 
declaration he relied on statements of other per-
sons at the city jail who had not seen the insured 
suffer any epileptic attack and had no knowledge 
on which to base their statements. Their state-
rnents to the doctor on which he relied were per-
fectly conjectural. The declaration in the death 
certificate was almost if not entirely destroyed by 
the admissions of the ones who were instrumental 
in causing such state1nent to be inserted. It is 
true the doctor found a condition, which unde-r 
certain circumstances might produce convulsions 
similar to epilepsy, but he gave no professional 
opinion under oath that the fall was caused by 
an attack of epilepsy and indeed in view of his 
admitted uncertainty as to causal factors the jury 
would have been justified in disbelieving his 
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Contrary to the Griffiln case, Dr. Olson, who signed 
the death certificate and the medical proof of cause of 
death, stated in his testimony at the trial that it was 
still his opinion that the cause of death was a cerebral 
embolism (Tr. 51-57). Dr. Peltzer was of the same opin-
ion (Tr. 81). Dr. Goddard, the only other physician 
testifying at the trial, said, "I would say that I am in 
no position to venture an opinion due to the fact I was 
not present at the man's death," and wrote on Exhibit 
1, "'This man has since expired, at which time I was not 
in attendance, but apparently due to his heart disease." 
(Tr. 70). Counsel for Plaintiff tried to elicit testimony 
that an autopsy might have shown something different as 
the immediate cause of death (Tr. 41), but while Dr. 
Olson ad1nitted that there were other possibilities, the 
best the c.ounsel could get from him was, 
Q. In view of that then, Doctor, I take it that 
your statement as to the cause of death carne 
upon the death certificate as cerebral artery 
embolism is subject to change~ 
A. Yes, if I saw proof by autopsy I was in error, 
I certainly would change it. It still is my 
best judgment that it ·is the cause of death, 
but I have no proof except judgment b~ed 
on symptoms the last moments of his life." 
(Tr. 51). (Emphasis supplied). 
Upon cross examination, Dr. Olson said, 
Q. You state in the death certificate you signed 
and in this· medical proof of cause of death, 
Exhibit 3, "cerebral artery embolism" as the 
cause of death, Doctor~ 
A. Yes, that is my judgntent. 
14 
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Q. That is your signature' 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. That is still your best judgment~ 
.A.. It is n1y best judgment. It may be in error, 
but that is what I thought at the time. 
Q. You have heard nothing since to make you 
change your mind~ 
_A_. There is a difference between the way 
patients die when they have pulmonary 
embolism and when they have cerebral em-
bolism. 
Q. And from what Mrs. White told you, you 
were and are of the opinion it was cerebral 
artery embolism~ 
A. Yes (Tr. 56-57). 
Dr. Peltzer's testimony was substantially similar: 
Q. I asked you if you had an opinion as to the 
cause of death, the immediate cause of death 
based on the history of the disease and Mrs. 
White's description of his last hour. 
A. Well, I have several. I will have to conceive 
of several things that could have caused it, 
one of which is the most likely possibility, 
it is cerebral embolism. 
Q. You think that is the most likely~ 
A. Statistically, yes ( Tr. 81). 
And at Tr. 83, under cross examination by Plain-
tiff's counsel, he said, 
Q. One could be pulmonary embolism~ 
A. As I heard the testimony, the reason I put 
cerebral before· pulmonary, the history is not 
15 
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pulmonary embolism but more likely cerebral 
embolism. 
Q. You wouldn't say pulmonary embolism is 
not possible~ 
A. It isn't completely impossible. It is possible. 
Q. As to the other causes, they are possible~ 
A. You might understand they are cardiac 
causes. 
Q. I am talking about this death certificate. 
A. They are related diseases of his heart. 
Q. The death certificate is not conclusive as far 
as we are concerned~ 
A. In the absence of autopsies, no. 
Other than these doctors quite honest admissions 
that it was "possible" they could be in error if an autopsy 
showed otherwise, but that they did not think so, there 
is no evidence explaining or contradicting the death 
certificate, and no issue for the jury on the question of 
cause of death save speculation on whether an autopsy 
would have shown these two heart specialists to have 
been in error. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in applying Utah Law to a 
similar policy in 
said, 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York vs. Has-
sing, 134 F'ed. 2nd 714 
"It is incumbent upon one asserting liability 
under ·a contract of this type, to show by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that death re-
sulted directly from bodily injuries independently 
a.nd exclusively of all other causes; effected solely 
16 
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through external, violent, and accidental means, 
\vhich necessarily implies that death did not re-
sult indirectly from disease or bodily infirmity. 
[Citing cases]. The jury was so instructed, and 
its verdict was in the affir1native. If there are 
any facts or reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the fact tending to support the jury ver-
dict, it must stand, although the jury may have 
been justified in reaching a contra conclusion. 
But the verdict Inust find some substantially af-
firmative support in the facts and circumstances. 
"• ~ * the law contents itself with probabilities, 
and declines to wait for certainty before drawing 
its conclusions." Lewis v. Ocean Accident & 
Guarantee Corporation, 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 
56, 57, 7 A.L.R. 1129. But the law is not cont·ent 
with mere possibilities, conjecture:s, or surmises. 
The jury is not permitted to guess or sp-eculate 
on the cause of death. (Emphasis supplied). 
See also 
Troutman vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 
125 Fed. 2nd 769. 
(b) Plaimtijf Failed to Meet Her Burden of Proof. 
As succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his 
concurring opinion in the Griffin case (133 Pac. 2nd 333 
at 343), 
"The burden of proof that (a) The insured 
suffered injuries (b) The injuries directly caused 
the death (c) Such cause was independent of all 
other efficient cooperating causes (d) The in-
juries occurred solely through violent means, ex-
ternal means and accidental means, is on the 
Plain tiff." 
Another similar analysis of what a contractual pro-
vision similar to this one in the case at bar requires of 
17 
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a Plaintiff was the following statement by the Pennsyl-
vania court in 
Lucas vs. Metropolita;n Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 
277, 14 At. (2d) 85, 131 A.L.R .. 235. 
"Where the liability of the insurance carrier 
is so restricted, it is not sufficient for the insured 
to establish a direct causal relation between the 
accident and the loss or disability. l-Ie must show 
that the resulting condition was caused solely by 
external and accidental . means, and if the proof 
points to a pre-existing infirmity or abnormality 
which may have been a contributing. factor, the 
burden is upon him to produce further evidence 
to exclude that possibility." (131 A.L.R. 235, 
239). 
To attempt to meet. this burden in the case at bar, 
Plaintiff did show that the insured did suffer an injury, 
the bump on the leg in the accident described by Mrs. 
White. To show that the bump on the leg directly caused 
the death independently of all other cooperating causes, 
Plaintiff must establish the following syllogism: ( 1) The 
bump caused the gangrene, independently of any other 
·cause; (2) the gangrene caused the amputation; (3) the 
amputation created a blood clot which lodged in the 
brain, ( 4) therefore, the bump independently, directly, 
and exclusively of all other causes, resulted in the death 
of Milton H. White. 
Plaintiff tried to establish this syllogism in one 
easy step in her counsel's hypothetical questiqn to Dr. 
Olson, the first question app·earing at pages 41-44 of the 
transcript, and the second on pages 44 and 45 .. To these 
questions, Dr. Olson had no opinion ( Tr. 44, 45). Plain-
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tiff like,Yise failed to establish any evidence to support 
points (1) and (3) of the syllogism . 
.L\s to the argument that the bmnp on the leg was 
the sole cause of the gangrene, Dr. Goddard, the man 
\Vho performed the operation and had Mr. White under 
his care, testified on behalf of Plaintiff just the opposite. 
A pathological examination of the diseased leg showed 
that :Jlr. '''hite had also been suffering from obliterating 
thrombo-angiitis of the vessels of the right leg, which 
condition is also known as Buerger's Disease (Exhibit 
5 and Tr. 45 and 73). With respect to this situation, Dr. 
Goddard on cross examination said : 
"Q. Now, with a man who is suffering from 
heart disease of the type Mr. White was, 
and Buerger's Disease, would it be more like-
ly that a blow of the type described; that is, 
with the sharp edge of the bench on the 
back of the calf, would cause some injury to 
the vein or artery than not~ 
A. With respect to the Buerger's Disease, it 
would be more likely than with a person not 
so afflicted. 
Q. Would it have any effect on the circulatory 
system~ 
A. I don't think, on a blow on the leg. 
Q. With Buerger's Disease it would~ 
A. Yes, they apparently were. 
Q. And they would be damaged and more sus-
ceptible to injury~ 
A. Yes." (Tr. 7 4). 
Dr. Peltzer came to the same conclusion: 
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"Q. Now, Doctor, if a man of about Mr. White's 
physical characteristics, which you heard de-
scribed, were not suffering from Buerger's 
disease and from rheumatic heart condition, 
would a blow of the type you heard described 
in court today be likely to cause an injury 
to the arteries which would result in gan-
grene~ 
A. I would have to say that a similar blow on 
a normal artery would be unlikely to cause 
gangrene in extremities and in an otherwis~ 
normal body." (Tr. 80). 
There was no evidence to go to the jury to the effect 
that a blow similar to that described in 1\frs. White's 
testimony would be likely to cause an injury to the cir-
culatory system, resulting in the gangrene, of a person 
not suffering from a rheumatic heart or Buerger's Dis-
ease. 
Similarly, Plain tiff failed to show the third step of 
her required syllogism. Dr. Olson, in his discussion of 
the circulatory system, stated that for a clot originating 
in the leg, as a result of the operation, to reach the 
brain causing death by cerebral embolism would be, by 
the nature of the circulatory system, an impossibility, 
except for the very unusual situation of a paradoxical 
embolism (Tr. 60-61). Even its name indicates its rarity. 
Dr. Olson said he would not expect it (Tr. 61) and that 
it was so improbable and infrequent as to cause a report 
in the medical journal (Tr. 63), and that it did not occur. 
in this case (Tr. 64). Dr. Goddard said it would be very 
rare (Tr. 72) and Dr. Peltzer testified with respect to 
paradoxical embolisn1, "I believe Dr. Olson quoted well 
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""hen he said it is such a rarity that it is still a reason 
to publish an article in medical literature. I couldn't 
tell yon statistically, but it is an extremely rare incident. 
It is so rare that there are no statistics-only isolated 
cases reported." (Tr. 80). 
Again, no evidence of any affirmative nature, that 
the death dealing clot could have resulted from the oper-
ation, "Tas produced by Plaintiff. Can a jury be per-
Initted to speculate on the occasion of a paradox so rare 
that it is cause for reports in medical journals~ Is an 
honest admission by a doctor that he could be wrong, 
as there is no certainty short of an autopsy, evidence 
to be considered and speculated upon by a jury as bear-
ing upon a possibility of a cause of death other than 
that testified to by the doctor and unsupported by any 
other evidence~ 
Mutual Life v~. Hassing, Supra, and Trout-
;nan vs. Metropolitan Life, Supra. 
Contrast the overwhelming evidence that the clot 
came from the diseased heart. White had a rheumatic 
heart. Typical of a rheumatic heart is an off-beat known 
as auricular fibrillation (Tr. 53). A concommitant of 
auricular fibrillation is the throwing off into the blood-
stream of clots called emboli ( Tr. 54, 79). White had 
an embolic episode in the spleen in November, 1948. He 
had another in his leg in September, 1949. He had a third 
in his kidneys in January, 1950 (Tr. 5,5). Dr. Olson, 
without contradiction, said he had a fourth in the brain 
causing the death ( Tr. 56, Exs. 2 and 3). All of these 
¥Jere without dispute in the evidence. 
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Plaintiff has also suggested one other syllogism to 
tie the bump .on the leg to the death. That line of reason-
ing is: (1) Bump caused the gangrene (2) Gangrene 
caused the operation (3) The ope·ration put Milton H. 
White in a state of decline of health from which he 
eventually died. It has already been shown that point 
one is fallacious and that the gangrene could not have 
come from the bump in the absence of the Buerger's 
Disease condition or the diseased heart condition. Like-
wise, Plaintiff failed to establish any evidence to sup-
port this point three. Dr. Olson, in answer to Plaintiff's 
long, hypothetical question which stressed the supposed 
decline in health after the operation and concluded: 
"Q. Doctor, would you say it is possible, having 
in mind the hypothetical question, the long 
one I asked you a short time ago, is it pos-
sible this blow on the leg would have a causal 
connection on the man's death~ 
A. I have no opinion on it. 
Q. You have no opinion~ 
A.· No, I don't know. 
Q. Would you say it is impossible 0? 
A. I don't know, there is no way to tell." (Tr. 
45). 
Another hypothetical question was put to Dr. God-
dard, another of Plaintiff's witnesses (Tr. 68): 
"Q. Now, doctor, in view of that information, and 
in view of what you saw of the patient in 
September, October, November and December 
of 1949, and in view of the embolectomy, the 
amputation of the leg, and the resultant con-
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finement to his bed, and his house, I will ask 
you if you have an opinion as to whether 
or not the injury described as a bump, or a 
knock on the rear of the calf of his leg, on 
the rear of the calf of the right leg causing 
pain then and thereafter, would have causal 
connection to the n1an's death on February 
14th, 1950, 
~\.. I did feel it would necessarily have to a have 
a causal effect. 
MR. SNOW: That is all." 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BILLINGS: 
"Q. You say "necessarily," Doctor, on what basis 
do you reach that conclusion 1 
A. I would reach that conclusion on the basis. 
that anything that would damage one's health 
with an already existing condition, such as 
Mr. White had, would hasten his demise. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Q. That is the only meaning of the word "nec-
essarily," is that correct then 1 
A. In my opinion, it would." 
Dr. Goddard also said the operation was over with 
(Tr. 72), and the recovery was normal, thus breaking 
the chain of causation of this theory of Plaintiff's. Dr. 
Olson described a new heart attack coming in January 
1950 (Tr. 55) which is a new cause, independent of the 
blow on the leg. Counsel for Plaintiff also attempted 
to get some solace for this desperate theory from Dr. 
Peltzer (Tr. 84) : 
"Q. You heard Dr. Goddard, I suppose, when he 
said that the injury which has been de·scribed 
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here today necessarily had a causal connec-
tion to death, I suppose you disagree with 
that~ 
A. Not completely. 
Q. You do not C9·mpletely disagree with it~ 
A. No. 
BY MR. BILLINGS.: 
Q. What do you mean by that, Doctor~ 
A. I mean if a man is suffering from a serious 
cardiac disease which requires such measures 
done to him. 
Q. Drugs~ 
A. Digitalis and mercuhydrin, that is a usual 
indication of advanced heart disease and the 
method in which they were employed. Any-
thing that would happen to that man, let's 
say, in his diseased cardiac state, for in-
stance, he might have fallen out of bed, what 
to other individuals was common trauma., 
he might have in a way aggravated this con-
dition, any incident in his life, let's say, that 
interfered with his normal cardiac condition 
would assist. 
Q. Would you say that that type of trauma you 
have described, could have caused his d~ath 
independently of the cardiac disease from 
which he was suffering~ 
After some objection, the answer at page 85: 
"A. Not in a normal healthy individual, I am try-
ing to put emphasis on the fact that in the 
presence of cardiac disease, instances of 
traumatic injury, not important to the human 
body, and in the presence of cardiac disease 
they do aggravate the condition. 
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Q. You 1nean this blow fron1 the bench, you 
have described, 1night have had some connec-
tion 'vith his death, is that right' 
.A.. And also I am trying to describe the fact, if 
a 1uan has disease of the arteries-
Q. Buerger's Disease' 
.. A.. Buerger's Disease, that a blow in those cir-
cumstances "~ould cause a more significant 
injury than if he didn't have Buerger's Dis-
ease so the blo'v plus the fact he did have 
that disease 'Yould aggravate the heart dis-
ease n1ore." 
It is submitted, as was said by this court in the 
Tucker case, supra, 
"Where the record discloses no dispute con-
cerning insured's physical condition over the year 
prior to his injury, and there being no dispute 
as to the cause of death, we must find the court 
erred in submitting the facts to the jury and 
erred in giving its instructions. In view of the 
record, the court should have given Defendant's 
requested instruction No. 1 directing the jury 
to return a verdict of no cause of action in favor 
of D·efendant and against the Plaintiff." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION No. 9. 
Instruction No. 9 ( R. 22) provides, 
"You are instructed that where an accidental 
injury sets in motion or starts renewed activity 
of a previously existing but quiescent disease or 
condition, and such disease or condition contri-
butes to the death, after having been so precipi-
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tated by the accident, the disease is not a diroot 
or indirect cause of death, nor is it a contributing 
cause as in the meaning of the language of insur-
ance certificates. In such case, the accident is a 
sole cause of death. 
"·Therefore, if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the deceased Milton H. White 
had previously been afflicted with a heart con-
dition which condition was not active and which 
condition was not to be expected to cause his 
imminent death, and, if you further find by a pre-
ponderance in the evidence that the injuries suf-
fered by the said MiJ_ton H. White· set in motion 
or renewed the activity of said heart condition, 
and that therefore said heart condition contrib-
uted to the cause of death, I instruct you, in such 
event, you must return a verdict in favor of the 
· Plaintiff and against the Defendant since under 
such a finding, the accident, under the law is con-
sidered to be the sole cause of death." 
This instruction is an obvious attempt to apply 
the rule of the Lee case, 
Lee vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 95 
Utah 445, 82 Pac. 2d 178 
to the case at bar, but, as said by the court in the Tucker 
case, the facts in that case were materially different. 
"Lee previously had been ill from gall blad-
der -trouble, but at the time of the accident this 
condition was not active but dormant, and was 
completely walled off, and had not the injury 
directly disturbed this and caused it to become 
active, the condition which was dormant and w~ll­
ed off might never have contributed to the In-
sured's death." 
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In the case at bar, the heart condition was anything 
but latent or dorn1ant. ,V.hite had an e1nbolic episode 
in 19-±S (Tr. 70). He had another in 1949 ('~rr. 71). He 
was hospitalized in Septen1ber 19-±9 for congestive heart 
failure. He was being actiYely treated with the drugs 
mercuhydrin and thion1erin, which are heart medicines 
used in advanced heart disease and congestive failure 
(Tr. 70). The condition of l\Ir. 'Vhite's heart was not 
set in motion by the blow on his leg any more than Mr. 
Nichols' arteries 'Yere hardened or his blood pressure 
raised by the fracture in the Tucker case. 
The distinction between the case at bar and one 
where the Lee doctrine can be applied is well exem-
plified by a recent decision of the Tenth Circuit apply-
ing Utah Law in a diversity case: 
Kansas City Life Ins. Co. vs. Hayes, 184 
Fed 2d 327. 
In that case, a man in previously good health fell 
down the stairs in his home and died within a few hours. 
After an autopsy, the report gave the cause of death as 
first, multiple traumata to almost all portions of the 
body, and second, chronic, recurrent rheumatic heart 
disease with formation of ball thrombus in the left 
auricle appendage which became dislodged into the 
mitral orifice, occluding same. Another doctor, a heart 
specialist, who observed the autopsy, stated that in his 
opinion the ball thrombus was loosened by the fall of the 
deceased and that it eventually occluded the valve of the 
heart causing death. From his examination, he con-
sidered the insured's heart essentially normal for a man 
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his age and showed nothing which in his opinion would 
cause death in the absence of the fall. There was also 
other evidence to the effect that the ball thrombus was 
caused by a rheumatic heart. The Circuit Court said 
' 
"In sum, it seems to be agreed that the imme-
diate cause of death was a dislodged ball throm-
bus which occluded the mitral valve shutting off 
circulation. There was a difference of opilnion on 
whether the fall caused the thrombus to dislodge 
and occlude the mitral valve, or whether the 
occlusion was caused directly or indirectly from 
a diseased heart. . . . We agree with the trial 
court that the facts in our case presented a jury 
question whether the accidental fall set in motion 
a latent or dormant disease condition resulting 
in death of the insured." (Emphasis supplied). 
In the case at bar, there was no difference of 
opinion as to the source of the embolus. Both Dr. Olson 
and Dr. Peltzer ~greed it came from the heart. In the 
case at bar, the heart disease of White was not dormant 
or latent but active, and though partially under control 
by the medication prescribed by Dr. Goddard, and later 
by Dr. Olson, it still was throwing off emboli which 
blocked arteries in the spleen, leg, the kidneys, and finally 
the brain. 
It is submitted that in giving the jury instruction 
No. 9 the court submitted to it an issue for which there 
was no evidence in support and opened the door to sheer 
speculation, bias, and prejudice. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING THE JURY 
ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
Instruction No. 8 ( R. 21) provides, 
Hlf vou find that the deceased Milton H. 
,v---hite h~d ailn1ents or infirmities of the body 
at the time he suffered an injury, by reason of 
which ailments or infirn1ities he had a weakened 
condition "Tithout normal powers of resistance, I 
instruct you that he might nevertheless have met 
his death by reason of external, violent, and acci-
dental injury within the 1neaning of the insurance 
certificate in this case. 
'•If you find, in the preponderance of the 
evidence that he suffered an injury because of 
external, violent, and accidental means, and if 
you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that such injury was a real, direct, and efficient 
cause of his death, Plaintiff is entitled to your 
verdict even though you might believe that a 
normal or more robust person would have had a 
greater capacity to resist such an injury and 
might not have been killed by it." 
That instruction is another approach to the second 
causation theory of Plaintiff discussed above. It has 
already been shown that all the evidence was to the effect 
that in the absence of his heart condition and Buerger's 
Disease, the slight blow on White's leg would never have 
started a chain resulting in death. It has also been 
shown that this chain was broken by the recovery from 
the operation testified to by Dr. Goddard, and that an-
other heart attack occurred in January, 1949 introduc-
ing a new and independent cause as testified to by Dr. 
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Olson. Dr. Olson also testified that the probable cause 
of the nausea which Plaintiff claims weakened White 
was the drugs he was taking for his heart condition (Tr. 
47, 62), and that it was not typical of a recovery from 
amputation. Dr. Goddard testified the recovery was 
normal and that they were discussing a prosthetic device 
when Mr. White died (Tr. 72). 
Or, if this instruction be applied to the first syllo-
gism mentioned above, Plain tiff has likewise failed to 
produce any evidence to support that line of argument. 
But even if it be accepted, arguendo, that the blow caused 
the clot in the leg which caused the gangrene, indepen-
dently of any other cause, still Plaintiff failed to pro-
duce any evidence that the clot originating in the leg 
went to the brain causing the death. 
In addition to the fact that the evidence does not 
support a finding of the jury on this instruction, the 
instruction itself does not correctly state the law applic-
able to the contract between the Defendant association 
and Plaintiff's decedent. The certificate (Ex. A) pro-
vides in part, "there shall be no liability whatever when 
disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause 
of death." The By-Laws state in part, "there shall be 
no liability whatever, unless death or disability results 
wholly from the injury, nor when any disease, defect, 
or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause of death, dis-
ability, or injury." 
In 
Tucker vs. New Y ark Life, supra 
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becau~e of the decedent's diseased and weakened con-
dition, his artery Hrould not stand the increased blood 
pressure ocra~ioned by the fall or the strain imposed 
upon the aorta after the injury." Such a finding fits 
neatly into instruction No. 8, but this court, with an 
insurance contract not nearly so restrictive as the one 
now before it, placed that case, without a dissent, in 
category three and reversed a judgment entered on a 
yerdict for the Plaintiff. 
It must be recognized that some courts have allowed 
recovery 'vhere there is no active disease, but merely 
a frail or ·infirm condition of the body which renders 
the individual more liable to serious effects from an 
injury than an average person. See 1 Appleman, Insur-
ance La.w and Practice, Sec. 403, Page 500, and cases 
therein cited. But that is not this case, any more than 
the Tucker case fell within that category. Compare, for 
example, 
Frame vs. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 
358 Pa. 103, 56 Atl. 2d 76 
which the Pennsylvania court held to be within the class 
of cases mentioned in Appleman, with 
Lucas vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S·upra .. 
In the latter case, Plaintiff had an automobile acci-
dent in 1926 which resulted in a bone deformity which 
could have caused arthritis. The suit was for arthritic 
disability claimed to have resulted from a fall in 1938. 
The court held the 1938 fall merely accelerated and 
aggravate·d the progress of the disease. In the Frame 
case, the decedent was 71 and was partially paralyzed 
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from an earlier cerebral hemorrhage. He died after 
suffering a broken leg and ribs and hip· resulting frmn 
a fall downstairs. The court there sustained recovery 
on the ground there was no evidence the disability 
caused the fall. 
Some respect must be given to the provisions of the 
contract. It is submitted that an existing disease or 
infirmity which aggravates the effect of the injury, 
Tucker vs. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, or is aggra-
vated by the injury, Runyon vs. Commonwealth Casualty 
Co., 109 N.J.L. 238, 160 At. 402, is a contributing cause, 
Railway Mail .Ass'n vs. Stauffer, 152 F. 2d 146, (C.C., 
D·.C.) Railway Mail.Ass'n vs. Weir, 156 N.E. 921 (Ohio). 
To come within the Appleman class of cases and n1eet 
the terms of the policy, the instruction 1nust make clear 
that the ailments or infirmities are wholly inactive. 
Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance So., supra; Kelly 
vs. Prudential Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 143, 6 At. 2d 55; Leland 
vs. United Commercial Travelers, 233 Mass. 58, 124 N.E. 
517. This, instruction No. 8 fails to do. By thus leaving 
it open to the jury, the court authorized the jury to com-
pletely disregard all the evidence as to the active nature 
of White's heart condition and Buerger's Disease, other 
than the finding that they made him more susceptible 
to injury, of which fact there was no question. 
Nor do instructions No. 5 and No. 6 correct the pre-
judicial errors in instructions No. 8 and No. 9. All the 
former do is present instructions conflicting with and 
contradictory to No. 8 and No. 9 as to the law pertaining 
to the insurance policy in issue and what Plaintiff 1nust 
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','' 
1.' I• 
show to recover. And, as ""as said by this court inK onold 
vs. Rio Grande Western Railzoay Co., 21 Utah 379, 60 
Pac. 1021, 
''Instructions on a material point in the case 
which are inconsistent or contradictory shall not 
be given. The giving of such instructions is error 
and is sufficient grounds in a reversal because 
it is impossible after the verdict to ascertain 
which instruction the jury followed or what influ-
ence the erroneous instruction had in their delib-
erations. This has been so uniformly held that 
citations are unnecessary." 
See also 
and 
Sorensen vs. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 Pac. 72, 
Jensen vs. Utah Railway Co., 72 Utah 366, 
270 Pac. 349. 
Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 introduced before the 
jury facts which were not presented by the evidence and 
were well calculated to induce them to suppose that such 
state of facts, in the opinion of the court, was possible 
under the evidence and might be considered by them as 
a basis for imposing liability on Defendant association. 
Giving such instructions constitutes reversible error. 
Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. Co., supra; 
Parker vs. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 
Pac. 2d 425; 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the trial court 
was in error in not granting Defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict, that the error was compounded in sub-
mitting the case to the jury under erroneous instruc-
tions which raised issues not substantiated by the -evi-
dence and that the court perpetuated such error in fail-
ing to grant Defendant's motion for a new trial or for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same 
grounds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS., 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, 
MOFFAT & MABEY, 
.Attorneys for Appellant. 
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